Colombo, 02 October 2026 – In a significant ruling, the Court of Appeal today dismissed a writ application filed by former President Nandasena Gotabaya Rajapaksa, seeking an order to prohibit his arrest in connection with the tragic Easter Sunday terror attacks of 2019. The two-judge bench, comprising Hon. Justice N. R. Abeysuriya PC (P/CA) and Hon. Justice K. M. S. Dissanayake, delivered the comprehensive order on 01 October 2026, finding the application premature, overly broad, and containing a suppression of material facts.
Background to the Former President’s Petition
Nandasena Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who served as President and previously as Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, had lodged the application (CA/WRT/0443/2026) under Article 140 of the Constitution. His primary grievance stemmed from an apprehension of imminent arrest without “sufficient and cogent evidence” regarding the Easter Sunday Bomb Attack. The Petitioner’s apprehension was reportedly triggered by media reports, including SMS news alerts, and a travel ban imposed by the Fort Magistrate’s Court in connection with investigations into Channel 4 revelations by one Asad Mowlana.
Mr. Rajapaksa had explicitly sought an order in the nature of a writ of prohibition to prevent the Inspector General of Police (Priyantha Weerasooriya), the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (Gnanendra Shani Abeysekara), the Officer in Charge of the Special Investigations Unit (Madhawa Gunawardena), and the Hon. Attorney General, or their agents, from arresting or taking him into custody concerning the Easter Sunday Attack.
A key aspect of his petition also involved allegations of hatred, animosity, and mala fides on the part of the 2nd Respondent, Gnanendra Shani Abeysekara. Mr. Rajapaksa cited Mr. Abeysekara’s removal from the CID Director post upon his election as President, Mr. Abeysekara’s subsequent arrest during his tenure, and adverse recommendations made against Mr. Abeysekara by various Commissions of Inquiry as reasons for potential bias.
Petitioner’s Submissions: Liberty and Judicial Scrutiny
Counsel for the Petitioner, led by Dr. Romesh De Silva PC and M. U. M. Ali Sabry PC, argued vehemently for the protection of individual liberty, describing it as “sacrosanct.” They drew heavily on landmark judgments such as In Re Mark Anthony Lyster Bracegirdle (1937), Marie Indira Fernandopulle v. Minister of Lands and Agriculture (1978), and Joseph Fernando v. Minister of Land Development and Minor Export Agriculture and Others (2003). These cases underscored the principle that the legality of executive orders, including arrests, must be objectively examined and subjected to judicial review, irrespective of the status of the official involved.
The Petitioner’s counsel also highlighted the necessity of Wednesbury Reasonableness for arrests, particularly under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) and the Code of Criminal Procedure Act. They referenced Supreme Court rulings like Tiran Alles v. Ilangakoon and Others (SC/FR/171/2015) and P. W. T. Dhanushka v. Inspector General of Police and Others (SC/FR/170/2022), asserting that the burden is on the peace officer to demonstrate reasonable suspicion for an arrest and that courts must objectively determine its validity.
Respondents’ Counter-Arguments: Prematurity and Scope of Relief
Representing the Respondents, Suharshie Herath, DSG, with Rajika Aluwihare SC and Tharaka Kodagoda SC, contended that the Petitioner’s apprehension of arrest was “materially unfounded, devoid of factual justification and premature.” They argued that the petition lacked any material evidence, communication, or document to substantiate an imminent threat of arrest. Crucially, the Respondents pointed out that the investigations into the Easter Sunday bombings were ongoing, and that formal investigations against Mr. Rajapaksa had only recently commenced, without him even being questioned or named as a suspect.
A central plank of the Respondents’ argument was that the relief sought – a “blanket prohibition” against arrest – was “overly broad” and “repugnant to the very core and essence of administrative relief.” Granting such an order, they argued, would grant indefinite immunity and severely impede ongoing investigations, irrespective of any future cogent evidence that might emerge. This would, in effect, create a mechanism for individuals under investigation to obtain immunity from arrest prematurely.
Furthermore, the Respondents alleged a “suppression and/or misrepresentation of a material fact” by the Petitioner. They presented a photograph (marked D2) depicting Mr. Rajapaksa with Asad Mowlana, directly contradicting the Petitioner’s categorical assertion in his affidavit that he had “never met the said Asad Mowlana and has no connection whatever with him.” The authenticity of the photograph and its location at the Petitioner’s private residence were not disputed during the proceedings.
The Respondents also dismissed the allegations of animosity against the 2nd Respondent, stating that such claims required concrete proof, which the Petitioner failed to provide.
Court of Appeal’s Decision and Rationale
The Court of Appeal, in its detailed order, upheld the Respondents’ submissions and dismissed the application, refusing to issue formal notices. The ruling was primarily based on three key findings:
- Prematurity of the Application: The Court agreed that the application was premature. Hon. Justice N. R. Abeysuriya PC, stated, “Mere apprehension of the prospect of an arrest would not suffice. The action sought to be prohibited must be pending.” Given that there was no decision to arrest the Petitioner, no indication of such a course of action pending, and not even a statement recorded from him, the application was deemed speculative.
- Overly Broad Relief Sought: The Court found the prayer for relief in paragraph (b) of the petition to be “overly broad, vague and open-ended.” Granting a blanket prohibition against arrest in connection with the Easter Sunday Attack, irrespective of future evidence, would be “too broad” and set a dangerous precedent, hindering criminal justice. The Court referenced K Gunapalan and Others v. Hon. Minister of Rural Economic Affairs (CA/WRT/431/2016) to underscore its reluctance to issue vague or broad orders.
- Suppression and Misrepresentation of Material Facts: The Court strongly agreed with the Respondents’ contention regarding the discrepancy concerning Asad Mowlana. The categorical assertion by the Petitioner that he had “never met” Mowlana, contradicted by an undisputed photograph, amounted to a suppression of material facts. The Court reiterated the principle of “uberrima fides” (utmost good faith) required from applicants seeking discretionary relief, citing cases like Blanca Diamonds (Pvt) Ltd., v. Wilfred Van Els and Two Others (1997) and Biso Manika v. Cyril De Alwis and Others (1982).
The Court also clarified the scope and ambit of a Writ of Prohibition, emphasizing its supervisory function to restrain inferior courts or public authorities from acting in excess of their jurisdiction, rather than to monitor or interfere with ongoing criminal investigations at an early stage. Hon. Justice Abeysuriya PC noted a significant increase in such premature writ applications, warning that this trend “would lead to a situation where the criminal justice system of this country would be severely jeopardized, pace of investigations retarded, and suspects enjoying immunity from arrest for a prolonged period of time.”
The bench distinguished the current case from CA/WRT/07/2025 (Ceylon Newspapers (Private) Limited vs. Inspector General of Police and Others), where a writ of prohibition was issued to prevent arrests. In the latter, investigations were considerably advanced, suspects had been formally named, and some arrests had already occurred, unlike the “early stage” of investigations concerning Mr. Rajapaksa.
Ultimately, the Court underscored the need for judicial restraint, particularly when intervention could impede lawful criminal investigations or the proper exercise of jurisdiction by subordinate courts. The application was dismissed without an order as to costs.
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