Colombo, Sri Lanka – 24 September 2026 – The Sri Lanka Court of Appeal today, September 24, 2026, delivered a significant order dismissing an application for the substitution of a deceased petitioner in a long-running writ of Mandamus case concerning leasehold rights over a parcel of railway land in Bandarawela. The ruling, handed down by Justices B. Sasi Mahendran and Adithya Patabendige, underscores the personal nature of such claims and the limitations of substitution in writ proceedings.
Background to the Dispute: A Decades-Old Land Saga
The original petitioner, Andra Baduge Colin De Silva, had initiated legal action against Sanjaya Senanayake Mudalige, the General Manager Railway, and Ranjith Ganganath Rubasinghe, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Transport, seeking a Writ of Mandamus. The core of his petition was to compel the 1st Respondent to implement a settlement reached in a previous Court of Appeal judgment (CA/2062/2001) dated May 18, 2005. This settlement mandated the transfer of Lease Bond No. LC-31667 into the petitioner’s name upon payment of outstanding lease rentals.
The genesis of the dispute traces back to 1976 when the petitioner’s father, late A.B. Richard De Silva, was granted an alternative allotment of approximately seven perches of railway land in Bandarawela following the acquisition of his original leased land. A Lease Bond (LC-31667) was issued, though the petitioner alleged an erroneous extent of 2.8 perches was stated, contradicting a subsequent railway survey Plan No. LA-13175 which reflected seven perches. A four-storey commercial building was subsequently constructed on this land.
The situation escalated when railway authorities sought to terminate the lease, leading Colin De Silva to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. The 2005 settlement, a pivotal point in the timeline, required the transfer of the lease bond to his name, contingent on the payment of approximately Rs. 5.5 million in lease rentals, which the petitioner claimed to have fulfilled. Despite this, he alleged, the railway authorities failed to effect the transfer and continued to recognise an overlapping lease held by another party, J.M. Kulathilaka.
Death of Petitioner and the Substitution Application
While the current writ application (CA/WRIT/582/24) was pending, Andra Baduge Colin De Silva passed away on March 15, 2025. Subsequently, his son, A.B. Sampath De Silva, filed an application on November 6, 2025, seeking permission to be substituted as the petitioner to continue the proceedings. The proposed substitutors argued they were entitled to pursue the application as legal representatives, asserting that the reliefs claimed would affect the deceased’s estate and the leasehold rights would benefit his heirs.
The Respondents, represented by Senior State Counsel Rajin Gooneratne, objected to the substitution. Their primary contention was that the cause of action in the writ application did not survive the petitioner’s death, particularly as the original petitioner had allegedly failed to comply with the conditions of the 2005 agreement, specifically the payment of dues. They further argued that the relief sought via Mandamus was founded on a legal duty owed personally to the original petitioner, and no such duty was demonstrated to exist in favour of the proposed substitutor.
Court’s Deliberation: Personal Claim and Procedural Gaps
The Court of Appeal, in its detailed order, meticulously examined the legal principles governing substitution in writ applications. Justice B. Sasi Mahendran, delivering the order, noted that the Court of Appeal (Appellate Procedure) Rules, 1990, expressly provide for the substitution of respondents, particularly public officers, but lack any explicit provision for the substitution of a petitioner in writ proceedings. Such substitution, the Court held, could only be permitted if the cause of action itself survived the death of the petitioner.
Referencing the seminal case of Leelawathi vs Manel Ratnayake [1988] 3 SLR 354, where G.P.S. De Silva, CJ (as he then was) articulated the principle of “Actio personalis moritur cum persona” (a personal action dies with the person), the Court reiterated that a right conferred personally to an applicant comes to an end upon their death. The Court further cited Perera and 3 Others v. Abeyrathne, 79(2) NLR 99, which clarified that a Writ of Mandamus issues only where the applicant establishes a clear legal right and a corresponding public duty owed to them personally.
In the instant case, the Court found that the claim advanced was “inextricably linked to the personal right asserted by the Petitioner.” It observed that the proposed substitutor had not demonstrated an independent statutory or public law right accruing to them personally, nor had they established a public duty owed by the Respondents to perform the acts pleaded in their favour.
Furthermore, the Court pointed out critical omissions in the original petition, including the failure to disclose reasons for the delay in paying the outstanding balance as per the 2005 agreement and the absence of any demand made to the Respondent to transfer the deed to the petitioner’s name. Emphasising that the land belonged to the State, the Court concluded that title would only pass once the agreement conditions were fulfilled. Since the original petitioner had, in the Court’s view, failed to fulfill these conditions, he had acquired no rights over the land that could subsequently pass to his heirs. The agreement, being between the original petitioner and the respondent, effectively came to an end upon his death without full compliance.
Order Dismissed
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismissed the application for substitution. No order was made for costs. Justice Adithya Patabendige concurred with the judgment, thereby concluding this aspect of the complex legal battle over the Bandarawela railway land.
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